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A MODEST
D E F E N C E
OF THE
A R M Y.

By a SOLDIER.

In ANSWER to a Late PAMPHLET,
INTITLED,
A TREATISE concerning the
M I L I T I A.

*Non est ea medicina, qua sanæ
Parti corporis, atque integræ;
Scalpellum adhibetur.*

*Neque quies gentium sine armis, neque arma
sine stipendiis, neque stipendia sine tributis ha-
beri queunt.*

L O N D O N :

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ERRATA.

In Page 14, Line 9, for *patirentur* read *pa-
terentur*; p. 16. l. 12. for *Fines* r. *Times*; p. 35.
l. 4. for *Sirtortia* r. *Sebertia*; p. 46. l. 9. for
having r. leaving; p. 55. l. 16. after 500,000 l.
add per Ann; p. 64. l. 5. for not r. most.



THE
 CASE
 OF THE
 ARMY, &c.

IT is a bold Thing I know in this Country to lay a Word in favour of a Standing Army, or against our beloved Scheme of a Militia; and to combat so formidable an Antagonist as the Author of the late Treatise, with all the Clamour and Prejudices of the People on his Side, I doubt, even a presumptuous one; yet a much harder than both it is, to shake off one's own old Opinions, perhaps Prejudices too, in favour of any Doctrine that does not carry absolute Demonstration along with it; and to subscribe to it without

Conviction, though for the Love of Peace, where so great Interests as the Security and Well-being of our Country and most happy Government are concerned, would be rather Meanness than Humility. Besides, the poor Army has been so attack'd and so peck'd at of late, so written and so declaimed against, and has taken it all so tamely, I began to be afraid it would fare with our unlearn'd Profession, as it does with those of an unlearn'd Religion in *Turkey*, (so they call a Religion which none of its Professors writ in Defence of) who, as Sir *P. Rycault* tells us, are treated with the most general Insolence and Contempt. And this I am sorry to say is indeed somewhat the Case of the Army already, whose Fate is whimsical enough. For when we are in actual War, or threatened with any immediate Attack, that is, when the People are in a Fright, and see and know their Danger, nothing is so courted, caress'd, and honour'd as the Army; but when the Danger is
not

not so apparent, though the Necessity still as real, (for our good People are but a purblind Sort of Politicians) nothing so dreaded, hated, abused ; so that the Soldiers of this Country seem to be treated like a Band of public Assassins, just flatter'd for the Job they are to perform, and then discarded and disgraced. Not that I condemn the People for their Ingratitude or Ignorance in this, so much as I do those who teach them, who ought to know better, and generally do, but have their own good Reasons for what they say. Some think the Government too strong, and some too quiet. Some of the sworn Friends to the Family and Succession are such Revolutioners, that they are for a new Revolution; and many, whose Merit is not duly rewarded in these smooother Times, are for fishing in troubled Waters. Some write for Reputation, and would overturn the World with Projects to obtain the Character of a Wit ; and some, the most pardonable of all, write for Bread. Nor, after all,

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is Gratitude a Reason of State. If the Army have ventured their Lives cheerfully, if they have serv'd the Nation well, and saved it in all our Memories from the worst of Calamities; if they have supported the Crown and Government, and with them our solid and essential Liberties; the Old and Maim'd, it may be justly said, have *Chelsea*, most of them with eighteen Pence or two Shillings a Week; the rest had their Pay; and it is but fit they and their Leaders should now be despised and followed with Reproach, and even Infamy, for this plain Reason, that they are no longer wanted. This has been the Sum and Conclusion of all their Arguments; but that Question of their not being wanted, long begged and never granted, though generally swallow'd by the People as if it were; (who are taught to look upon an Army in Time of Peace as a Thing of meer Parade) seems now to be made pretty clear, since the Patriots themselves and *Schemers of Militias*

own

own that an Army is *wanted* in Time of Peace! They have nobly held out against their own and the Reason of all the World, as long as ever they could, and having yielded at last, it ought to open the Eyes of the Nation, and give them a Key to all the fine Declarations they have heard upon the *superfluous* and *unnecessary* Burthen of a standing Army! and at least convince them, that those, who have kept them up for theirs and the Government's Defence, are not quite such Fools or Knaves as they have been represented.

But to come to the late Treatise and Plan for a Militia. The Author tells us very truly, that this Business of a standing Army, and Militia, has been very long a Subject of Debate in and out of Parliament; so that he seems to apprehend Men grew a little tired of the same old Strain of Declamation, and perhaps was afraid the People might grow too easy

easy under our present Establishment ; especially at this dead Ebb of Opposition, when so many of their great Oracles seem unaccountably silenc'd ; and their most important Interests so strangely neglected, that hardly any thing but the petty Considerations of improving our Trade, providing for the Poor, or securing the Quiet and Peace of the Nation, seem to be thought of. In this State of Things, the absolute Necessity of some new Thought, to awake the Attention of the People, naturally offer'd itself to the Author.--- Not but that the present Age has been fertile enough in Attacks upon the Army too, as our own Memory can tell us, who have sometimes heard it call'd too many, sometimes too few for our Defence ; sometimes ridiculed for too little Discipline, sometimes dreaded for too much, just as the Wind of Opposition sat. But the old Joke of Want of Discipline was not so seasonable now ; and the new Dread of *too much*, an Absurdity too great to be long-lived ;

lived. It was too little an Object for one of the Author's Genius, to piddle about two or three thousand Men more or less; and the Necessity of a *Standing Army*, through all the Colours cast upon it, has long stared every body in the Face. What's to be done in this Dilemma? We must have something out of the common Road, as the Author tells us, so the old Doctrine of Forty-one is to be reviv'd, the Nation must have an Army its true, even a standing Army, but the King is not to be trusted with it. It must change Hands, and as we have so severely smarted once by the Experience of a Parliament Army, we are now to try a Lord-Lieutenant's Army. Yet Eighty-three Regiments of Horse and as many of Foot, with Distribution of Rank and Emoluments in the Hands of Provincial Lords, and with such Powers Civil and Military as this would vest in them, is a Monster too new in this Constitution to be admitted, without the most serious and solid Arguments,

ments, and the strongest Necessity to support it! A little trite Declamation upon the Danger of a Royal Army, nor ringing the old Changes upon *Romans, Janizaries, and Mamelukes*, will never do it. So that the Author, who plumes himself upon the Novelty of his Plan, should have done it the Justice to enforce it by some little Novelty in his Arguments, and not have left it to the Mercy of such ancient, threadbare Reasonings as are to be found in the first Section, which serve as a Basis and Foundation to the rest; and where after the *Romans, Janizaries, Mamelukes, Cæsar, Oliver, and Q. Elizabeth* are properly introduced, we hear, that *though it is true the Existence of a standing Army is annual and depends upon the Will of Parliament, this Renewal may in future Times become a Matter of meer Form.*

We are not told why; and I believe every body sees it is a Question too important and
too

too interesting ever to pass in that Manner ; that it may, some Years, and upon some Occasions, pass without Debate. I can conceive, when the Necessity of it is very apparent, but never with Indifference, or without Reflection ; or that it will pass at all, if ever the Power of the Army comes to be abused to the Oppression of the People, as our Declaimers prophesy : And that, if ever it should be so abused, I think as near to impossible as any political Supposition can well be ; and that, for this Reason, particularly, because the Army is, and I think always must be constituted (the Officers I mean) of such as have for themselves, and for their Families and Connections, more Interest to preserve the Constitution, than they can have to destroy it. That it is so constituted I need not prove ; and that it never can be otherwise, will be pretty plain, from a little Consideration of our Government ; as a Change of this Kind can neither be suddenly, nor

imperceptibly effected; nor can it be the Interest of any King or Minister to effect it; nor indeed could they effect it if they would. When King *James* attempted to garble and model the Army, the *Army* themselves opposed it; and when his Designs for subverting both the Religion and Liberties of the Nation, shewed themselves so determined, that nothing but Force could restrain them; the *Army* were among the first to abandon him, and shew that they knew the Value of Liberty like other *British* Subjects, and were resolved to maintain it. --- Again, has not the Impracticability of a King's governing without a Parliament long appeared? and has not the Revolution absolutely fixed and confirmed that Impracticability? Which of our Princes has attempted it since, or how fared it with those that attempted it before? Is it possible then for the Crown to keep Men of Estate, Interest, and Consideration, out of Parliament, or to deny them their natural
Weight

Weight when they are there? Or is it conceivable that such will sell their Birthright, and sap the Foundations upon which their solid and permanent Interest depends, their Lands, their Liberty and Property, to get their younger Sons, Brothers, or Cousins, a Commission in the Army? I don't say that none will, for these and the like Considerations; because I know no large Body of Men, not even P---ts, that have not Fools and Knaves, and egregious ones amongst them: But I say the Mass never can, for the Reason commonly given why they should, their own Interest, which does not lie that Way; and because Popularity, Ambition, and Discontent, Pique, Pride, and Emulation are always in the Scale with that Interest, to prevent it, and to add to the Weight against Court Influence. And the same Reason that prevents the Army from getting into low Hands, will also prevent their Number from encreasing to any dangerous Height, and for

the same Reasons. And so far is this from being likely to pass in Parliament, as a Matter of meer Form, which the Author surmises, that he himself tells us; *It has been the Subject of Debate in every Session of Parliament, from the Restoration to the present Time.* In these Debates, the Dangers and Burden of a Standing Army are stated against the Danger and Inconveniencies of being without one; the Necessity of the Army is stated, and the Number for the Service of the Year proportioned to that Necessity; and if not always in exact Proportion to it, which I would not maintain that do not hold the Infallibility of Parliaments; yet never swerving from it so far as to give any reasonable Alarm to the Liberties of the People.

Next, it is supposed, *The Army may be able to provide for itself, and refuse to be disbanded.* A Supposition supported by no Sort of Probability, and by no one Argument

gument from Fact, but that of the Army in the last Century, called a little improperly, I think, *The Executioners to the Parliament, when they cut the King's Head off*; as it is notorious, the Majority of the Parliament were Enemies to that Violence, and then driven from their Seats: But, be it as it will, that Army was certainly neither a Standing-Army, in our Sense of it, nor the Crown's Army; which makes me think it the worst Argument in the World in the Author's Mouth: It was the People's Army, raised in Opposition to the King's Army, and put in safe and trusty Hands for the Support of Liberty (as this of our Author is proposed to be) a preaching, praying, Patriot Army; who, like the Preachers and Patriots of other Times, *Ut imperium pervertant libertatem preferunt, si perverterint ipsam aggredientur*.--- By what Steps this was brought about, is long to tell and to little Purpose; certain it is, nothing but the Timidity and Pusillanimity of the
Majo-

Majority of that Parliament, and of the Nation, if they meant well, could have brought it about ; but after being wearied out with the Fatigues and Horrors of a long and bloody Civil War, they were reduced to a Situation, described in three Words, by *Tacitus* on a something similar Occasion, *Is Status animorum ut pessimum facimus auderent pauci, plures vellent, omnes patirentur*. It seemed as if the Hand of God was upon the Nation to chastise it ; and that he chose to make their own Folly, Weakness, and Infatuation, the Instruments of their Punishment : For at that very Juncture, when the Army pulled off the Mask, and seized at once the King's Person, the City, and the Parliament, were not even then Petitions sent up from several Counties, by this blind and infatuated People, in Favour of the Army, and perswading the Parliament to a Compliance, or rather Submission to it, while the *Scotch* Army, and the rest of the Nation, stood with their Arms
a-cross,

a-cross, and saw the bloody Business perform'd, the Execution at once of the King, and the Constitution? And next, by whom was this Army governed, and how Officer'd? *All of them* (says Lord Hollis) *from the General down to the meanest Centinel, not able to make a thousand Pounds per Ann. in Lands, most of the Colonels and Officers mean Tradesman, Brewers, Taylors, Goldsmiths, Shoemakers, &c.* An Army without Authority or Discipline; a Sort of Republick in itself, (as *Rapin* calls it) where the common Soldier had as much to say in their Deliberations as the Generals. Such were the Times when this Event happen'd, and such the Army by whom it was effected. Times of the greatest Violence this Nation ever knew; a Chaos of all Sorts of Principles, Religious and Political, all arm'd and warring with the most desperate and barbarous Zeal, or the most wicked Animosity, and an Army which had nothing but the Name like our present one; yet from this is drawn an Argument

ment in times of the greatest Liberty, in times of the greatest Peace, to do what nothing but the Errors and Vices of that Reign wou'd furnish that Parliament an Argument for ; rob the Crown of one of its most undoubted Constitutional Prerogatives, the most reasonable, the most natural, to the executive Power, the Government of the Army, and Dispensation of Military Honours and Rewards.

But what I say in respect of this Instance holds good, in great Measure, for all the Rest ; difference of Fines, Circumstances, and Constitutions, for *Rome in her old Age*, the *Turks*, the *Egyptians*, &c. without regard to which, to Reason, is to reason upon Words only. It wou'd not follow, because *Rome*, *Turkey*, and *Egypt* lost their Liberties by Standing-Armies, that our's was to enslave us : But I think the Fact is not so ; *Rome* lost her's by other Means, and from a Train of different Events, most of which have no Similitude or Connection with our Circumstances ; particularly
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from the unconstitutional Powers of great Men, their Plunder of Provinces, and immense Wealth; a long war of Factions, a general Relaxation and disjointing the Constitution, a Weariness of Civil War, (like our own just mention'd) and thence a tame Submission, and Indifference about their Liberty; and as to the *Janizaries* and *Mamalukes* so often sounded, I know of no Liberty either among the *Turks* or *Egyptians*, when those Establishments were introduced; they might indeed increase the Disorders of those very bad Governments, but upon the whole, brought, I believe, more Evils upon the Kings and Ministers of those Countries than to the People already enslaved. Not that I disallow the Evils of Standing-Armies overgrown in Number, and under improper Regulations and bad Discipline, nor that I deny their being used in many Countries as Instruments of Despotick Power, but in a Corrupt State, as in a diseased Body, every thing turns to Corruption, even that

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which is in its Nature designed for Support and Nutriment. Hence the same Establishments, that, in one Country serve the Purposes of Tyranny and Oppression, in another are but a necessary Support to good Government, to Order, and to Liberty itself, which is particularly true of an Army, and true too; I own that it wants many Checks and Restraints to make it safe, but I think it has those Checks with us, and, while it continues to have them, I don't apprehend our Liberties are in any Danger from it; when it ceases to have them, or when I see any Attempts made to emancipate it from them; when it grows dissolute, oppressive, outrageous, submitting neither to civil nor military Authority, as undisciplined Armies are, I will be as zealous an Enemy to a Standing, or a Crown-Army, as the Author himself; till I do see it so I shall not be for following every wild and childish Scheme that is proposed, at the Risk
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of running this Country into Confusion; and for letting go the real Freedom, Ease, and Happiness, that we enjoy under a mild and settled Government, in order to grasp at a Shadow of fantastick Liberty, that exists only in the Brains of Projectors.

But as to the Point of Disbanding, that I had almost lost Sight of; the only Army that ever refused it in this Country, was those Friends to Liberty we have spoke of; but since the Establishment of Standing-Armies amongst us, hardly five Years have passed without some Change of the Kind, in all which has there ever been known any Difficulty, any Combination in the Army not to be discharged? I for one, who am but short-sighted, don't see any Prospect of a Time when we can disband all our Forces, much less all at once; but, if it were necessary, am convinced there would not be the smallest Difficulty in the Execution, and for such

Reductions as are necessary, from Time to Time, according to our different Circumstances, no ordinary Act of Government is done with greater Ease, as our constant Experience shews.) It is now about four Years ago, that we reduced an Army of near sixty thousand Men, discharging at once no less than upwards of forty thousand; and now we are told eighteen thousand may provide for themselves, and not suffer the Government to discharge them; and that, because they are so mighty a Power, the whole Nation (where there are above a Million of fighting Men) won't be able to resist them!

The Evils therefore that have happened from Armies, in this and other States, have proceeded chiefly, as I said, from the Vices of the Governments themselves; and as our Government never had any perfect Form, nor our Liberties any solid Security, till the Time of the Revolution; so, from that Time,
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it is not even pretended by the Scriblers and Declainers, it cannot be, that those Liberties have suffered the least Attaint from the Army. Since then, it has been really and essentially the *Parliament's* Army, the People's Army, and but nominally the King's, or lodged in his Hands, like his other Prerogatives, by the Wisdom of our Constitution, with Ability to employ it for the useful Purposes of the Government, but not to turn it against the Liberties of the Nation. — In which State, let the Author make the most of the Argument he draws from the Use of those Phrases, *The King's Bread, the King's Service!* &c. and be governed by Sounds, if he pleases, or try how much better it would run, *The Lord-Lieutenant's Bread, the Lord Lieutenant's Service!* which will be just as proper, and, I suppose, as current as if his Plan takes Place.

But

But it is pleasant to hear him take notice of it as a great Enormity, that it is said; *We cannot be governed without an Army!* then propose an *Army* himself to govern us, telling us, *It is calculated for keeping Peace at Home, restoring Virtue, Regularity, and the Execution of good Government in this Country;* and that it seems the only Way to get rid of *Smugglers and Highwaymen*, viz. this *Standing-Army* of Country Regiments; where I think his Opinion of the Necessity of an Army in Time of Peace, and for the Purposes of Civil Government, is tolerably clear; though under the Name of *Mercenaries*, he makes so becoming an Exclamation against any such Thing, (Pag. 9 & 10) in these Words: *But, I say, God forbid he should ever be governed by Mercenaries!* And then, what is strangest of all, goes on, just after, to propose a Body of *Mercenaries* himself, a larger too, and a much more burthenfome one than that now kept up,

as

as I shall have Occasion to explain. Since, besides the Guards and foreign Garrisons, they are to consist of no less than eighty-three Regiments of Horse, and as many of Foot, in constant Pay, in lieu of eleven Regiments of Dragoons (including the Dragoon-Guards) and eleven Regiments of Foot, of which our present Establishment consists; which may serve to shew how likely this Scheme is to save us from a *national Bankruptcy!*

But that is not the Point; the Business was to exclaim against the particular Bankruptcy, that is to follow keeping up a *Crown Army*; and though a greater is introduced in its stead, it is but agreeable to the known Privilege of Projectors, who, when they have pointed out the Evils and Inconveniencies that attend the present Disposition of Things, have at all Times enjoyed full Liberty to introduce much more intolerable ones in its stead.

stead. — For as to this, it is plain, it is no Scheme of Economy, but a great and lively Project of noble Ambition, to revive the military Spirit of the Nation, restore our ancient Glory, subdue *France*, and once more *awe the World* ! Which last, the Author expressly tells us, (p. 43.) is to be done by the Establishment of this *new Species of Militia by Country Regiments* ; and yet these Regiments are never to stir out of their own *Shire*, no, not (p. 40.) *on any Pretext, or by any Command whatsoever* : So that the World must really take a strange Panick, to be so marvellously *awed* by this immoveable Militia ! This is certainly going a great Way, and I am rather astonished one of the Author's apparent Judgment and Solidity should be so positive, in so surprizing an Assertion.

The next Good promised by this Plan is, An infallible Preservative against all Invasions,

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Insurrections and Incurfions, (p. 15.) in these Words: *An Invasion will be Impossible, there can be no Insurrections, nor Incurfions, but what will be immediately stopt &c.* In which particulars, I own I am so blind or so weak, as to apprehend very different effects from it; as to the Insufficiency of these Forces, I shall say something by and by; but, since by this Scheme, Men of all Sorts and Denominations, of all Parties and Principles (except *known* Papiſts and Nonjurors only) are to be armed and formed into Regiments by Lot or Ballot indiscriminately, from the *Highlands* of *Scotland* (inclusive to the Land's End, it does really appear to me an odd Project; and, after all the Things we have seen and heard, and do see and hear daily, not a very prudent one. That there is a Party in this Nation disaffected to the Government is not now Matter of Doubt, and that they are not very few in Number, I am one of those weak enough to apprehend; in which situation, how do I know these Ballots will

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be

be fairly conducted ? We have a vigilant and subtle Enemy to deal with, stationed in every Corner of the Country, and watching every Opportunity : Besides, from the very Doctrine of Chances, if Arms were to jumble at once into many bad Hands, at the same Time that his Majesty's Army is disbanded, instead of being our Security against Invasions, Insurrections, and Incursions, it might possibly be a Promoter of them : For if the Militia of one or two Counties, in any Part of the Kingdom, should favour an Invasion, it would be Treason in those of the next to come and oppose it. However, these may be light and idle Fancies, it is an inconceivable Thing, it may be said, that there should be so many Jo--es in this Kingdom ! and it is indeed a strange Phenomenon ; but Men are inconceivable Creatures, acting upon inconceivable Principles. What monstrous, uncouth, unreasonable, and indefensible Opinions in Religion, in Politicks, in every
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thing do we see them daily attached to? It is the peculiar Privilege, it is said, of Man to be absurd, and it is a Privilege they really indulge in its full Extent: But two Things I have observed particularly in them; one, a great Facility to be led out of the Way, and the other, a settled Dislike to the present State of Things, be it what it will. With such Dispositions therefore, what may not be done by a Party under the Wing and Protection of papal Power and papal Policy, by Spies, Agents, Missionaries, Letters, Bulls, Promises, &c. Add to these the Prevalence of ancient Prejudices from our Grandfathers, Grandmothers, and Nurses, and still more the kind and well-meaning Endeavours of Friends, who, with a charitable View of mending Disorders in the State, and instructing and setting the World right, are spreading Dislike and Discontent among the People, in monthly, weekly, and daily Papers, Plans, Lessons, Animadversions, &c. — But

to these suppose should still add the pious and unwearied Labours of a whole Uni--ty, in the same good Cause. What, if one of the two great Luminaries of this Kingdom should shed the same Influence; if, after instilling the Poison into her Sons in her own Bosom, she should send out *her* Missionaries too, in Concert with those of the Holy Father, to all Corners of the Nation to dispense it; and what, if these Missionaries should many of them be our appointed Pastors and Teachers, the very Men from whom we are to learn what we ought to believe? After all this, I will allow the Wonder to be great, though not quite so great, while these Things are permitted. --- But, as to Insurrections and Com-motions, I think this Plan bids fair to be a perpetual Nursery of them, particularly at the Time of Elections; for as Party-Spirit runs very high, and they are generally attended with Feuds, Heats, and Violence, and frequently with broken Heads; might

not

not so many armed and disciplined Electors change our Mobs on those Occasions into little Civil Wars? Among the Author's favourite *Romans*, one of the Causes that hastened the Fall of that Constitution, was the enormous Gratifications and Bribes given by the great Heads of the Factions, to the Soldiers that followed them; so that *Julius Cæsar*, *M. Antony*, and *Octavius*, are said, I think, to have given no less than 5000 *Drachmas* to a common Soldier. A common Soldier at present is not worth Bribing, but to a Company, or Regiment of County Electors; what Bribe cou'd be sufficient? In this, I am persuaded, we should be very *like the Romans*, and what's better still, if possible, come nearer back to that happy State of our polite Ancestors, describ'd by the Author, when *in Councils where the People were Present, they gave their Votes, or Assent by striking with their Swords, or Lances on their Shields.* Delightful Councils, and a charming Picture of
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the Times ; something like what we are told of our Brethren, the ancient *Germans*, in their highest Barbarity, and the *Celts*, I think were never seen without their Arms.

The next Section, which is dedicated to the Consideration of the *Romans* particularly, begins with some general Reflections upon the Use of Militias, which we agree with the Author, are to be found in very great Plenty, both in ancient and modern History ; but by no means confined to Free-States, as he wou'd insinuate, any more than the Use of Standing-Armies is to Despotick ones ; since in *France*, *Spain*, *Turky*, *Persia*, &c. we read of Militias, as we do of Standing-Armies among the *Dutch*, *Venetians*, *Genoese*, and *British* now ; and what is particular enough, the *Dutch* and *Venetians*, the two most considerable Republicks in the World, were amongst the first States, as Sir *William Temple* tells us, that gave into keeping up Standing-Armies

Armies in time of Peace, all which, if it were otherwise, we must take into Consideration the Difference of Times, and the almost Impossibility of bringing Militias to match regular Troops. As to ours therefore of *Poitiers*, *Agincourt* and *Cressy*, the Experiments of those Days certainly prove nothing in regard to the present, as Militias or occasional Troops formed all the Armies then. But one Thing is remarkable, particularly on this Subject, that the first King of *France* who established any Regular Troops, *Charles VIIIth* was the same that recover'd all our Conquests in that Country, and beat us off the Continent.) Nor is much more to be argued from *Q. Elizabeth's* Militia at the Time of the *Armada*, which the Author seems to lay such Stress upon; since they were not tried, and had certainly no Hand in preventing the Invasion then intended: For I have never heard that the *Spanish* Court was at all awed or terrified by the assembling our Militia; but, on the contrary,

contrary, have heard that many at that Time had not the same Confidence in that Militia for repelling an Invasion that the Author has in his, and thought it not only *possible* it might be made, but also attended by the most fatal Consequences ; not reckoning our raw Forces at *Tilbury*, under their great Commander, the Earl of *Leicester*, a Match for the Duke of *Parma's* Veteran Troops, besides those on board the Fleet ; and 'tis said Sir *H. Vera*, even there at the Head of his Army, told *Q. Elizabeth* he was afraid he should be thought the greatest Coward there ; but that he could not help being much alarmed for the Event.---- Now, for the *Romans*, who are to be our great Example : First, I apprehend they had no such Thing as what we call a Militia, or Train'd Bands, with Officers appointed, &c. Every Man in that State was obliged, being of a certain Age and Condition, to serve in the Army ; and, being at proper Times assembled, were chose into the
Legions,

Legions, much in the Manner the Author describes ; but where two material Distinctions are to be observed between their Plan and his ; First, that, by his, the Men are to be taken by Lot, and the *Romans* had experienced Officers to chuse those fittest for the Service ; on which Subject *Lipsius* says, *Quin nifi Eligis & Excerptis, non Militem sed Turbam habes.* Next, *They* were so press'd in Time of War, and for the actual Exigencies of the State ; and *Our's* are to be made Soldiers, whether they will or not, in Time of Peace ; and this for the sake of Liberty !

But what made the *Roman* Armies so excellent was, the extraordinary Discipline of the Legions, and the perpetual Wars they were engaged in, which enured them to Dangers and Hardships ; so that the Temple of *Janus* was shut by *Augustus*, after the Defeat of *M. Antony* for the third Time only, I think, from the Foundation of *Rome*;

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and the second from the Establishment of the Republick. And the same Causes, though in a less Degree, make the *Swiss* Troops so good at this Day ; the Use of War being, in my Opinion, the very first Article in making good Soldiers ; and good Discipline the next. *The innate Bravery of the People* takes but the third Place, being a Quality I fancy much more equally divided among the Inhabitants of *Europe*, than many are aware of ; and as to our *Military Sports*, mentioned by the Author, whatever they are, I doubt they come a long way behind. So that to be persuaded, as the Author seems to be, that we shall be as great and warlike as the old *Romans*, by gleaning two or three such little Circumstances from them as this Plan would introduce, puts one in mind of such as are accurate in imitating the Dress, the Gestures or Deportment of great Men, and leave out nothing but their Virtues and Abilities to make the Resemblance perfect. We learn
 exactly

exactly here how the Young Men were summoned, how the Tribunes sat, and how the Tribes and Centuries throng'd to the Capitol; how many Sirtortia the Knights were worth, and how they paraded with Purple Robes and Crowns of Olive; but of their Order, their Discipline, their Arms, their constant Warfare, and Manner of Fighting, not a Word; with which I shall take my Leave of the *Romans*, not daring to debate with the Author, whether *Romulus* increased his little Kingdom by the Accession of Thieves, Murderers and Banditti, or whether he erected his *Asylum* for honest and well-dispos'd Persons; much less decide that Question so essential to their Character, whether they violated the *Sabine Women* the *same Day* they took them, or 'made *Roman Wives* of them by Force the *next*; Points a little foreign to our Purpose, but on which he has really been very ingenious in defending his favourite *Romans*.

But having detained the Reader, I doubt too long, on these more general Heads, I now come in order to consider the Plan itself, which is divided into two Parts: The *First*, a general Scheme for a Militia, much as all the Schemes of the Kind are; the Young Men to be called out to Exercise once a Month by the Church-wardens, &c. and this with a Determination of the Property and Condition of those who are to serve, is as much as relates to that Part properly: But the *Second* Part, which is a Plan for a new Species of *Standing Army*, being that which the Author lays the greatest Stress upon, and most of these Regulations being common to both, I shall consider them chiefly as they relate to that favourite, and, as he says, most useful Part of his Work.

And this I shall consider in two Lights;
1st, as a Military Regulation meerly; and,
2^{dly},

2^{dly}, as it concerns the Civil Interest of this Country.

As a Military Regulation, one should first see what Number of Men it gives us in lieu of those we are to disband ; but this the Author has left us to find out as we can : However, as I have no Doubt of their being enough, from the Nature of this Plan, I shall refer my Guesses on that Head to the other Part of the Argument, by which Means the Question on the present one will be reduced to the Quality of these Troops, and an Option between this and our present Standing Army. Now, as an Army in this Kingdom is chiefly calculated, as I apprehend, for its Defence, though some may carry their Views farther, the first Questions one should naturally ask about it are, What are its Numbers ? How it can be readily assembled ? By whom it is to be commanded ? And how it is like to be disciplined ? As to the First, we
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can only say, at present, of 166 Regiments, 83 of Horse, and as many of Foot. As to the Second, that it is never to be *assembled* at all, that is, properly, never to be an Army at all; and, consequently, an infallible Security against *Invasions and Insurrections*! for if Eight or Ten Thousand Men, or less than half that Number, were landed in any County in *England*, they might beat up the Quarters of these County Regiments, one after another, and march through the whole Kingdom without meeting with any thing like an Army. Or if there was an Insurrection in any County too big for the Militia of that County to master, or if the Militia themselves made the Insurrection, those of the next could not be brought to quell it, without being *declared Enemies to their Country*! it being expressly provided, by the Eighth Article, that *neither the General Militia, nor the County Regiments, or any Part of them, so as to make a Body of armed Men, are to march out*

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of their respective Counties, upon any Pretext, or by any Command whatsoever, writ in great Capital Letters, and, as far as we see, without any Exception at all. By which 'tis plain, as to the Third Question too, that, though the Author seems to compliment his Majesty with a Sort of Command over them, where he says the Lord Lieutenant is to have the Command, &c. under the King; yet 'tis plain, that, as an Army at least, his Majesty, nor any body of his Appointment, can ever command them.

As to the *Fourth Question*, of their Discipline, one need but consider how they are constituted; Regiments [of County Voters, Men of Substance, under the Command of Civil Colonels, Lord Lieutenants of Counties; the chief Officers I will suppose generally Men of Fashion, and their Relations, except a Grazier or Malster, has better Interest in the County; the Body of the Soldiers, Farmers,

ers, Tradesmen, Shop-keepers, Inn-keepers, Weavers, Brewers, Bakers, Butchers, &c. many of whom, no doubt, their Merit and Interest would advance to Commissions; How closely such Gentlemen would attend Quarters; how strictly they would be kept to their Duty when they were there; and, consequently, what Proficiency they would make in their Two Years Service, is easily supposed: So that seeing of this mighty Army of 166 Regiments, unless they are very numerous indeed, we could never see Five Hundred Men together, and those but poorly disciplined. It looks to me as if, instead of conquering *France*, and awing the World, we were more likely to pay Thirty or Forty Thousand Men for little more than to *protect Travellers* and *suppress Highwaymen*! which, though the Author seems to think an Advantage considerable enough to balance the great Expence attending on so large a Standing Army, I own I cannot be quite of his

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Opinion; his Words are, *This Expence to the Counties (viz. that is, of paying and cloathing two Regiments in each County) will be sufficiently repaid by the Service of these Regiments; which, by being properly posted, as the Lord Lieutenant shall see necessary, will protect Trade and Travellers!*

I now come to the *Second* Consideration of this Plan, as it concerns the Civil Interest of this Country; and seeing how little it is calculated for the present State, Disposition or Genius of the People, I cannot help thinking the Author wrote it in a learned Rapture, when his Head was full, and his Heart enamour'd, of the great Atchievements of the *Romans*, without considering how it would suit our Constitution. As the Way of Projectors, I have a Notion, generally is, to form their Plans first, and then square them to our Situation as they can, or transplant them from Countries, where they are of a Piece,

with the rest of their Constitution, into ours, with which they have no Consonance or Connection. If it had not been so, our Author could never have thought of taking the *Romans* for his Model ; a People whose Government was form'd, as he himself remarks, entirely upon a *Military Plan* ; whose Policy it was to be engaged in constant Wars of Acquisition, and whose Wealth itself came by Conquest, and the Plunder of Provinces, having scarce any Commerce amongst them ; and proposing them for an Example to us, whose Constitution has nothing military in it, whose right Policy is to act defensively only, and whose Wealth and Power flow from a general Spirit of Industry, of Commerce, Manufacture and Agriculture. *Those* Dispositions in them, made a general Use of Arms highly proper there, and *These* in Us would make it very unfit and impolitick here : Not that I think this Project would make us very like the *Romans* neither, as I have

have said; but I doubt we should just take the inconvenient Part of their System, and leave the good: The Excellence of their Armies consisted in the constant Use of War, and in the severe Discipline of the Legions; and the Author, to make us exactly like them, has contrived an Army that seems never intended to fight at all; and taken care, by their Composition, they should be incapable of much Discipline; and, yet with this Unlikeness to the *Romans*, has unfortunately stumbled upon a Scheme as contrary to the State and Condition of this Country, as if he had adopted their eternal Warfare. ---- But, to be more particular, what strike me as the chief Evils of this Plan, are, first, the Expence, which I should imagine must be much greater than that of our present Establishment, besides its being much more unequally, and consequently more grievously levied. The Author indeed has not given himself any Trouble as to these Particulars;

but, after complaining heavily of the Burthen of our *present Army*, has passed over the *little Article of Expence*, in regard to his own, as a Matter not worth once mentioning, any more than that of their Number, which he has concealed too, lest it should give us some Light into it. Now, besides that it would be improper in me to intrench so far on his Province, I must own myself not skill'd enough in political Arithmetick to be able to say, from the Consideration of his Plan, with the Restrictions of the *Census*, &c. what Number of Men his Army will consist of; but, just to give a Guess at it, upon a Sort of military Calculation, it seems to be very considerable; as it is to consist of two Regiments in each County in *Great Britain*; one Horse, and the other Foot. Now, the very lowest Establishment of a Regiment of Horse, as I take it, is about 120 Men, and of a Regiment of Foot 300: There are in *Great Britain* 83 Counties; and consequently
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the Whole would amount, at this very low Establishment, to 24,900 Foot, and 9,960 Horse, in all 34,860 ; which, with the Guards, that the Author allows his Majesty, amounting to 4,801 Men, I think, upon the present Establishment ; and 1,815 Invalids, whom I suppose he would not immediately discharge, make in all 41,476 Men in constant Pay, which is 22,619 more than our present Establishment, now consisting of 18,857 Men, Guards and Invalids included.

But I must repeat that this pretends only to be a Guess, and that the exact Number must depend upon another Sort of Calculation,

I make no odious Remark upon the Number of *Highland* Regiments by this means added to the Army, after being taken by Lot out of the Mass of *Highlanders*, but can't help observing that the Expence of so many

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Regiments of *Horse*, stationed in a Country so little adapted to the *Manœuvres* of Cavalry as the *Highlands* are, seems rather superfluous. As to the rest, the Author will certainly deserve the Thanks of the Government, in having found out so much a shorter and easier Method to our Security, by *arming*, instead of *disarming*, the *Highlanders*, and having them to keep themselves in Order.

If therefore the Number of this Army, and consequently the Expence, turn out very great, as I imagine they must; so that Expence will be much more burthensome, by being very unequally levied: For, by the Regulation, (v. p. 34) Every Man worth from 40 s. to 300 l. *per Ann.* in Land, and from 40 l. to 3600 l. in personal Estate, is obliged to serve in Person, either in the Horse or Foot: From 300 l. to 500 l. *per Ann.* and from 3600 l. to 6000 l. in personal

sonal Estate, to serve in the Horse, or find a Foot Soldier ; and all above these Rates to find a Man and Horse for the Horse Service : By which it appears that a Man of 30,000 *l.* *per Ann.* in Land, contributes to the Militia no more than one of 500 *l.* or than one possessed of 6000 *l.* in personal Estate ; which, if in Money at 3 *per Cent.* gives 180 *l.* *per Ann.* in Goods, &c. may give much less.

Nor is there any Proportion at all in the Burthen between finding a Man or Man and Horse, and serving in Person ; since these Men are only to parade within their own *Hundred*, and being never to form into an Army, or march out of their County, can never be any great Tax on those that find them. In former Times, those that found Men and Horses sent them out into the Field equipp'd compleatly, and maintained them there at their own Expence. From hence also it appears, that an Estate of 20,000 *l.*

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per Ann. in the Hands of one Person, furnishes but one Man to the Militia ; and that the same 20,000 *l. per Ann.* in Lots or Parcels of 40 *s. per Ann.* each, would furnish no less than Ten Thousand Men ; in consequence of which, some Counties must have a much greater Number of Soldiers to maintain than others, in proportion as the Property of the County, whether in Lands or personal Estate, lies in more or fewer Hands. To take one simple Instance in Lands only ; Suppose two Counties, whose Rents are in each equal to 150,000 *l.* the one divided into Parcels of 40 *s.* each, gives 75,000 Men to the Militia, and $\frac{1}{10}$ of them, that is, 7,500 Men for the County Regiments ; the other, divided into Parcels of 20 *l.* each, gives but 7,500 to the Militia, and 750 for the County Regiments ; and consequently one of the Counties would keep up ten times as many Men, and be at ten times as much Expence as the other.

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But the greatest Evil of all in this Project is, that the whole Weight and Burden of it falls upon the trading, farmering, and manufacturing Part of the Kingdom; there not being a single Tradesman, Farmer, or Manufacturer in *Great-Britain* worth forty Pounds in the World, who, if this Scheme takes Place, will not be obliged to personal Service in these County Regiments, there to remain two Years; (p. 39.) and, after one Year's Vacation, if his Lot so fall, two more, and so on; and may be then draughted after this again into the Crown Army, there to serve seven Years, in Time of War, or three in Time of Peace.

There are great Exceptions in Favour of Courtiers, Peers, Knights, and Squires of great Fortune (Orders of Men, that, in a Manner, composed the good old Militias in

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the Golden Days of our Ancestors) but none that I see in Favour of the poor Tradesmen or Manufacturer.

I wonder, at least, the Author did not think of restoring the Honour of our ancient Chivalry, especially as the Knight answers so well to the *Roman Eques*: And, after all, if the military Service of our Country is to be done by Compulsion, I cannot see what better Right so many idle Courtiers (p. 35.) Knights and Squires, Sons to Peers, Sons to Members of Parliament, &c. have to be exempted from the Fatigue and Peril of it, than those upon whom all the Burden of it is to fall. --- Can the Farmer leave his Farm for two, perhaps for seven Years together; the Manufacturer his Work, the Merchant his Business, the Tradesmen his Shop, the Innkeeper his Inn and Custom; the Butcher, the Baker, the Brewer, the Malster, the Hatter, the Taylor, the Hosier, the Shoemaker,

maker, the Builder, the Mason, the Carver, the Plasterer, the Joiner, the Carpenter, the Painter, the Smith, the Brasier, the Coach-maker, the Wheelwright, the Bookseller, the Printer, the Upholder, the Cutler, the Gunsmith, the Chandler, the Stationer, the Weaver, the Dyer, &c. &c. &c. Men of some Substance, from 40 s. to 300 l. *per Ann.* or from 40 l. to 3,600 l. in personal Estate? Can such, I say, be dragged from their Family and Occupation at a Minute's Warning, without the utmost Inconvenience and Distress? Or will that also be made up to them by the convenient stationing of the County Regiments, and the Protection of Travel-
lers, &c.

I must not omit, however, that the Author has afterwards added, *That if any one, whose Trade or Calling depends upon his personal Attendance, and whose Family depends on his Trade, should chance to draw the Lot for*

entering into the Service of the County Regiments, he shall have it in his Option to substitute another in his stead.

If it is meant, conjunctively, for such as have Families only, it will certainly be an Ease as far as it goes; if, of both those Cases, *such whose Trade or Calling depends upon their personal Attendance*, as well as those *whose Family depends upon their Trade*, it will include all the Persons I have mentioned, and many more, I dare say, nine Tenths of the whole Militia, and consequently put an End to the *Census*: For I have no Notion of any Trade or Calling that does not properly depend upon the personal Attendance of those that exercise them; nor of any Person, or very few, within this *Census*, that have not some Trade or Calling. We are not told who is to be Judge of this Matter, and have the dispensing Power. I suppose the Lord-Lieutenant, whose Influence would be pretty considerable, without

without such an Augmentation, as by this Plan every Freeholder and Voter in the County is, or may soon be under his Command; and when it is considered what vast Detriment their Fortunes and Affairs must suffer from their Absence, which will depend upon his Pleasure; this, added to the ordinary Restraints of a military Command, in one who is something more than their Colonel, (having Power to quarter and station them where he pleases, giving Commission, &c.) it is plain, would make them Princes in their respective Counties. If this Power, therefore, over almost all the Voters in the Kingdom, mounts through the Lord-Lieutenant to the Crown, I think it a most exorbitant Increase of its Influence; and, if it centers in the Lord-Lieutenants, independently, a most unconstitutional and dangerous Source of Faction!

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The Article of a General Register of Men's Fortunes, I leave to the Author to discuss with the trading Part of the Nation, who, I have a Notion, would not be very willing to have all their Estates, real and personal, sifted into by the *Constables of Parishes*; and might think so close an Examination of them annually, as this Scheme proposes, (p. 35.) would be attended with some Inconveniences to their Affairs.

The additional Expence to the Nation by the Article of *Gratuities*, proposed in the *Addition*, (p. 52.) would be so very great, I can scarce think the Author had sufficiently considered it, or intended it seriously: The Proposal is, *That every Foot Soldier in the Crown Army, at the Expiration of his seven Years Service (Provided that whole Space has been in Time of War) should be intitled to an Annuity of ten Pounds per Annum during his*
own

own Life ; if only Part of the Time of such Service has been employed in War, then in Proportion less than ten Pounds per Annum, &c.

Now, as this new Militia is professedly not to be of any Use in our Wars, otherwise than by recruiting from it, the Crown-Army must be nearly as great in future as it has been in former Wars ; in the late War we employed about sixty thousand Men (exclusive of the usual Establishment in *Ireland*) and of these upwards of fifty thousand Foot : From whence it appears, that, if a War lasts seven Years, the Nation (exclusive of Deaths) would have about fifty thousand Annuities to pay at the Rate of ten Pounds each, amounting in the Whole to 500,000 *l.* besides extraordinary Gratifications to Serjeants ; of which, if we allow half to be taken off, in Consideration of such as die in the Course of the War, there still remains 250,000 *l.* over and above the Charge of *Chelsea* Hospital, against

against which the Author has not declared his Intentions. --- To answer all which extraordinary *Expences*; if any new Fund (*App.* p. 63.) should be wanting, (as undoubtedly there must, and a very large one) the Author proposes supplying it in a ready Way, *by easing us at once of the Poor's Rates*, (p. 63.) than which he seems to think nothing more *rational* *seasonable* or *politick*, can be hit upon. How seasonable, or rational, or how charitable such a Proposal may be, I shall not now discuss; but if any body, in the Service of the Government, had thought of converting the Poors-Tax to the Use of a Standing-Army, I think it would not have been quite so *politick*.

What then, seeing we are as unlike the *Romans* as possible, if we were to give up Plans so ill suited to our Situation, and with them all these Dreams of Romantick Glory and Conquest, contenting ourselves with a rational, defensive Policy, as becomes us, and
with

with a Defence the most natural, and the most agreeable to our present State and Condition, which is more to us than all the ancient Stories, and all the modern Plans in the World, the *Romans*, *Greeks*, and *Lacedemonians*, the *Utopias*, *Oceanas*, &c. --- First, by a due Attention to our Naval Power, and next, by doing as all *Europe* does, (at least while it does so) keeping up such an Army as we want and can afford ; and let that Burden, which must always be confessed to be one, sit as light as possible, by being equally laid, and by using no Force upon the Dispositions and Inclinations of People, and I do really think the Nation will be both happier, and better served.---In former Times, all the Wars in *Europe* were carried on by Militias, now they are all carried on by Standing-Armies and Regular Forces : No longer ago than the Beginning of the 16th Century, I think no Power in *Europe* kept up any Regu-

lar Foot in Time of Peace, except a few for Garrisons of Towns.

In the Wars of *Louis XI. Charles VIII.* and *Louis XII.* the Dependence of the *French*, and the Force of their Armies, lay almost intirely in hired Troops, *Germans* and *Swiss*. *Henry II.* instituted the first Regiments in *France*; his Father *Francis I.* having given him the Idea of it in his Legions, which were but of short Duration. *M. La Noue*, who wrote after that, about the Time of the *Ligue*, proposes keeping up four Regiments of Foot, as a Root to form an Army at any Time, in Case of Necessity: The Title of his Chapter is this; *Que sa Majeste doit entretenir pour le moins quatre Regimens d'Infanterie en temps de Paix, reduits tous a 2,500 Hommes; tant pour conserver la discipline militaire, que pour estre assure d'avoir toujours un gros corps de vieux Soldats.*

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That is a Propofal for keeping up 2,500 Foot in *France* in Time of Peace; and the *Gendarmerie* were then about four or five thousand, and now *France* keeps up near 140,000 Foot, and in all upwards of 170,000 regular Forces. The fame in Proportion may be faid of almost every State in *Europe*, where the Fashion, not of keeping Standing Armies only, but of studying and improving their Discipline, feems to be a neceffary Branch of Policy; of which every new War more and more evinces the Expediency. See what a Figure the King of *Pruffia* has made from this Attention to Discipline particularly; and fee what a Figure the *D--ch* have made from their Neglect of it. The former rifing up to be one of the firft Powers on the Continent, and, in the late Tranfactions there, courted and dreaded by almost all the States in *Europe*; and the latter, I need not fay to what they had brought themfelves.

In which State of Things, those Countries will be most respected abroad, and securest at home, who can maintain the most Troops, and the best, among the Powers on the Continent I mean; and, as far as naval Strength is not concerned, with us it is otherwise, as we are an Island, and a maritime Power properly; as such we do, and ought to make the Navy our first Care, and as a Power whose Policy is defensive, as I have said, I am far from thinking we ought to vie in Number of Standing Forces with our Neighbours; but am very clear, that eighteen or nineteen thousand Men, if we want so many, and can afford to keep them well disciplined, and under proper Command and due Subordination, (to the Civil Power particularly) are not likely to overturn the Constitution, or impair the Liberties of the People, and will give us more real Strength and Security than four Times
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the Number of such Troops as the new Plan would procure us.

The Author despises the Number of our Troops; but let him remember, it is not Number alone makes Armies strong, but Order, Discipline, and proper Command; without these, a Multitude in red Coats will be but like a Multitude in brown ones. *Exercitata paucitas ad victoriam promptior; rudis & indocta multitudo exposita semper ad caedem.* ---*Dieu* (it has been said) *est du cote du plus fort Escadron*; but not always *du plus nombreux*. M. Turenne said, a larger Army than 50,000 Men did but embarrass a General; the famous Scanderberg was content, I think, with ten or twelve thousand; and the History of the same Scanderberg, of Guiscard the Norman, of our own Edward III. and his Son, with many more, furnish numberless Instances, wherein Handfuls of Men, under good Order and Discipline, have routed immense

mense Armies under a contrary Disposition ;
 I would not therefore have my Countrymen
 deceived with the empty Name of Regi-
 ments and a Standing-Army, into an Idea of
 Strength that we shall not have, and what is
 worst, pay them as if we had ; I would have
 them know too, that under a false Colour
 and Pretence of Freedom, this Friend to their
 Liberties is going, if this Project succeeds, to
 lay on them a most odious Restraint and Ser-
 vitude ; and instead of restoring their ancient
 Militia, is introducing a Novelty, unknown not
 to this Constitution only, but, I believe, to
 any the most arbitrary in *Europe* (except the
Turkish only) that of forcing Men into mili-
 tary Service in Time of Peace ; a very grie-
 vous Thing it is to be prest even in Time of
 War, and, except on the greatest Emergen-
 cies, quite disused in our Land Service even
 then ; I wish it could also be so in our Navy.--
 All the old Militias were raised and called
 out in our Wars, and for the immediate Ex-
 igencies

gencies of the State ; and about that too lost as little Time as possible, six Weeks or two Months being, I think, generally the Term they were obliged to stay ; and even of this, the Inconveniencies and Difficulties were found so great, that I take it to be one of the chief Causes of the general Disuse of Militia. the several Princes and States finding by Experience, it turned much more to the mutual Advantage of the State served, and of the People serving, to take such for Soldiers as came voluntarily into the Service, and made War their Profession, than to drag others into it contrary to their Inclinations, from their other lawful Callings and Occupations. It is to be remark'd too, that these Occupations are increased, and, that Trade and Commerce, Arts and Sciences, which for a long Course of Time have been slowly moving from the East, have settled themselves, and been more particularly improved and augmented in these western Parts, much about the same Time,

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and in Proportion as this new Order of military Service by regular Troops has obtained. And if there is any peculiar Analogy or Propriety in these Things, as I imagine, it is more particularly so in Counties not addicted to Trade like our own; and is one of the Reasons given by Sir *William Temple*, why the *Dutch* were so early in the Establishment of a Standing-Army; a *Being*, as he says, *less warlike at Land, by turning so much to Traffick and to Sea.* (*Observ. on the Netherlands*)

This has certainly been equally our Case, where Arts and Sciences, Commerce, Trade, Manufactures, and Agriculture, have grown so fast; nor does it seem possible to me, that a general Use of Arms, and Turn to military Employments, should subsist in a Nation where these greatly flourish.

I shall only add one Remark, in regard to our military Rewards and Punishments; upon
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on which the Author passes a short Sentence; declaring, as to the latter, he apprehends, *They have been more severe in the Armies of this free Nation (though our Discipline has been generally the worst) than in the Armies of any other Country in the World, under the most arbitrary Government.* He only says, indeed, *He is afraid* it is so; but that, being a Figure of Speech, so commonly used to insinuate and propagate the worst Calumnies, I think nearly equivalent to an Assertion, especially on a Subject one professes to treat; and in a Matter not out of the Reach of any Body's Knowledge or Enquiry.

I have made some on this Head, and from the Result of them, been forced to conclude directly the contrary of what is here advanced: I know that in the general Estimation of all Military People acquainted with the Condition of our Service, and that of other Nations, none has been so generally en-

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vied, or thought so desirable as ours, either for the Officer or Soldier, which alone might convince one; and I speak of a Thing very notorious, that it is not just as the Author represents it, the most abundant in Punishments, and the scantiest in Rewards, of any Service in the World: Which, nevertheless, we learn from him pretty explicitly a little lower: (p. 51.) *Coming now to speak of Rewards for Military Virtue, I am afraid we shall find that our Rewards have fallen as far short of all other Nations, as our Punishments have exceeded them in Severity.*

After this, one should expect some Comparison of the Rewards and Punishments now used in ours, and the Armies of other Nations; instead of which, we are sent back to the Greeks and Romans again; upon whose Courage these Things bad, it seems, surprising Effects. I suppose the Author means those Marks of Distinction he just before men-

mentioned ; in which I agree with him it might be better, if more were introduced ; I mean of all honorary Rewards, which, tho' the cheapest of all, and costing little or nothing to either Prince or People, might be used to very good Effect. But why is so odious a Comparison made, and so entirely to our Disadvantage, between our Troops and those of other Countries ? when it is notorious that, not in ours alone, but generally in the Armies of all other modern Nations, this Sort of Rewards are in a Manner totally disused. There was once indeed something of the Kind established in *France* by *Francis I.* which was a Gold Ring, given as a *Mark of Distinction* ; but it was very little used, and soon quite left off : And this is the only Thing of the Kind I recollect to have met with, except you reckon the *Croix de St. Louis*, given to half the Captains in the *French* Army, and other military Orders, which are now most of them degenerated

from their original Institution; and given to Civil as well as Military Persons; or else, like the *Maltese*, *Teutonic*, &c. so confined by Proofs of Birth and Descent, that they are more like Titles of Nobility, than Rewards of Military Virtue.

In respect to pecuniary Rewards, I touch'd upon them before on the Head of Expence, and shall only say now, that though I am perhaps as much a Friend to the Army as the Author, I am in doubt whether the great Fund allotted to the Support of *Chelsea* Hospital, with the Out-Pension, added to the high Pay in our Army, may not be thought too heavy a Charge to admit of much Augmentation; and that in Time of War the General never fails to give Gratuities to those who perform any remarkable Action, as the taking Standards or Colours, exposing themselves in Mines, Sapping, or the like; which being done at the Discretion of the General

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on the Spot, can be better proportioned to the Merit of the Service perform'd: So that, upon the Whole, I believe few Soldiers are better rewarded than ours in a pecuniary Way. ----- But, in respect to Punishments, the Charge upon our Service seems still heavier and more unjust; where the Severity of them is so far from being greater than that used *in the Armies of all other Countries*, as is advanced, that I take both the Laws, and the Execution of them, to be more mild and gentle in ours, than perhaps in any other Military Service in the World. As to those of *Germany* in general, in the *Imperial, Prussian*, and other Troops, their Rigour and Severity are so well known, that it is unnecessary to dwell upon them; but when I speak of the *French*, the *Dutch*, the *Spaniards*, and even of our own, in former Days, and particularly the Halcyon Days of *Queen Elizabeth*, it may be more satisfactory.

As

As to the *French* then ; in the Ordonnance or Articles of War of the present King, made in the Year 1744, there are no less than 65 Capital Punishments, three of which with the Rack ; and besides these, 27 more, where the Punishment is the Gallies, and in many of them for Life, a Punishment scarce inferior to Death itself. Among these are many Crimes of a seemingly slight Nature, in Time of Peace as well as War, and some few even of a Civil Kind : Thus for a Soldier to be found with more than a Pound of unlicensed Tobacco, or Salt, is Death ; to shoot a Pidgeon on a Dove-house, the Gallies for Life, &c. and to strike or draw a Sword against even a non-commission'd Officer, a Serjeant or Quarter-master, though not on Duty, is Death ; with a vast many more I don't enter into any Detail.

In

In the old *Spanish* Articles, in the Time of *Philip II.* are 21 Capital Articles, and in those used there at present many more; as, since the Accession of this Family, they have adopted, I believe, almost entirely those of the *French*.

In the *Dutch* Service, by Articles of the States General, dated *Anno 1590*, are 47 Capital Punishments, and four more extending to Loss of Limb, or Maiming. And in a subsequent Ordonnance of the States, dated 1705, 54 Capital, and 2 more as above.

In those used in *Queen Elizabeth's* Army, under the Earl of *Leicester*, are 30 Capital Punishments, 3 of which with *Torments*.

And lastly, in our Own, at this Day, much fewer Capital or severe Punishments than in any of the rest; there being but 16 in all in
Time

Time of War, several of which are but Repetitions or Explanations of others ; and of all these, but three properly that can affect the Soldier in Time of Peace ; the two of Mutiny and Desertion being multiplied into four, meerly to explain the Sense, and render them clear and explicit.

So that, at last, these Laws of *Draco*, writ in Blood, as has been said, and so much *more severe than in the Armies of any other Country in the World*, turn out as different as they could well be from the Representations made of them, being, instead of the most severe, the very least so, I believe I may truly say, of any in the World : Which shews something of the Spirit with which such Animadversions are made.

In many Services in *Europe* there is a Subordination from the General down to the Centinel, almost amounting to Slavery ; the
General

General may put the Officer in Irons; and the Officer, not the commission'd Officer only, but the lowest non-commission'd Officer, a Serjeant or Corporal, may beat the Soldier for the smallest Misdemeanor with Sticks or Canes, at his Mercy, to a Degree that this Punishment is sometimes little less severe than the *Roman Fustis*. In Ours, none of this slavish Subordination is known; if the inferior Officer is wrong'd by his superior, or if a common Soldier is ill treated by his Officer, they are told in the Articles of War, and from his Majesty's Authority, where they may find Redress; nor can the private Centinel be either corporally or pecuniarily punished, but by a formal Trial and Sentence of a Court Martial. Notwithstanding which great Difference in the Liberty and Ease enjoy'd by our Troops, though for want of the same Kind of Severity, they can scarce arrive at the same Perfection in their Exercise and Discipline that the *Germans* have, they are

certainly much farther from being what the Author says they generally *have been, the worst disciplined in the World*: Whether he means they are so now I won't determine, but I am sure the Fact is otherwise, be it meant as it will. They are disciplined enough to be orderly, quiet and regular at home, and to do Honour to their Country abroad; nor is there any Fear they should fail in either, while they are under the Care of that great Person, to whom his Majesty has so properly committed the immediate Superintendence of them, and to whose Conduct, Vigilance and Activity this Nation has more particularly the Obligation of having, I may rather say, improved, than restored our Military Discipline, together with other Obligations of too high a Nature, I should hope, ever to be forgot by a grateful People.

F I N

